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Ever since the passage of the South Carolina Divorce Law' in
1949 there has been curbstone debate among lawyers as to wheth-
er the legislature had the power, in view of the mandate of the
constitutional amendment 2 of that year that divorce "shall be
allowed" on the ground of "desertion," to limit the granting of
divorces for desertion to cases where the desertion has continued
"for a period of one year." The point was raised on the first
appeal in the famous case of Simonds v. Sinonds,3 but the court
did not feel it necessary to decide it and the feeling grew that the
question would remain one of academic interest forever. However,
in Nolletti v. Nolletti4 the point was finally decided in the way
that most practitioners had predicted. irs. Nolletti, whose hus-
band had left her only one month before she brought her action,
admitted that she was not entitled to a divorce under the lan-
guage of the statute but maintained that its one-year requirement
was unconstitutional. The South Carolina Supreme Court unani-
mously rejected the argument. It pointed out that our constitu-
tion is basically a limitation upon legislative power rather than
a grant of such power, so that the effect of the 1949 amendment
was to prohibit the legislature from authorizing divorces on any
ground other than those enumerated, rather than to tie its hands
in prescribing conditions for the granting of divorces on those
grounds. The requirement that a desertion must continue for at
least one year before it matures into a cause of action for divorce
is in keeping with our public policy of refusing to dissolve mar-
riages on trivial grounds and is analogous, according to Mir. Jus-
tice Lewis, who wrote the opinion, to the rule which the court
has established in applying the statute, that a divorce will not
ordinarily be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of a
party. The date of the opinion was July 11, 1963, exactly one year
from the day that Mr. Nolletti left home, which presumably
allowed Mrs. Nolletti to obtain her divorce shortly after the man-
date was handed down. The delay may not have been profitable
to her but it permitted the solution of a long-standing debate.
* Lecturer in Law, University of South Carolina.
1. S.C. CODF ANN. §§ 20-101 to -148 (1962).
2. S.C. CONST., art. 17, § 3.
3. 229 S.C. 376, 93 S.E.2d 107 (1956).
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In Murdock v. AJurdock5 our court for the first time recog-
nized the concept of "divisible divorce." This doctrine, founded
upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Vander-
bilt v. Vanderbilt,6 provides that the full faith and credit which
must be given to a foreign divorce decree when only the divorc-
ing spouse is domiciled in that jurisdiction, does not require the
the honoring elsewhere of the alimony provisions of the decree
against a spouse who did not appear in the foreign proceedings.
The decree is considered constitutionally "divisible." It must be
recognized as dissolving the marriage but not as granting what
amounts to a money judgment, either in the award of alimony
against a non-appearing husband or a denial of alimony to a
non-appearing wife.
The Murdock case illustrates the doctrine perfectly. The wife
brought an action in South Carolina for a divorce and the hus-
band, although living in Kentucky, answered and counterclaimed
for a divorce. The referee found neither party entitled to a di-
vorce but recommended a separate maintenance decree and lump-
sum alimony to the wife. During the pendency of the reference,
the husband filed a divorce action in Kentucky with constructive
service upon the wife and by the time of the argument of excep-
tions to the referee's report in the South Carolina action, he had
obtained his Kentucky divorce by default and had filed a copy of
the decree, which denied alimony to the wife, in the South Caro-
lina proceedings. The circuit judge thereupon sent the case back
to the referee to consider the effect of the Kentucky decree. In
his second report the referee found that the Kentucky order ef-
fected a dissolution of the marriage under Williams v. Nortk
Carolina 17 but did not bar the wife's claim to alimony, recom-
mending again that the amount be granted to her in a lump sum.
The circuit court concurred in the findings and conclusions of
the referee and the husband appealed on the ground that the
court had not given the Kentucky decree the full faith and credit
required by article IV of the United States Constitution.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Brailsford, affirmed, saying that the Vanderbilt case was
a controlling precedent and quoting as follows from it at page
418:
5. 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
6. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
7. 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Annot, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1943).
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Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the
Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right
which she had under the law of New York to financial sup-
port from her husband. It has long been the constitutional
rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obli-
gation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the de-
fendant. Here, the Nevada divorce court was as powerless
to cut off the wife's support right as it would have been
to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had brought
the divorce action and he had not been subject to the court's
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Nevada decree, to the extent it
purported to affect the wife's right to support, was void and
the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New York
to give it recognition.
Vanderbilt certainly concludes the constitutional question but
the court might have had some little difficulty, if it had been
required to do so, in squaring the present holding with its own
rule as to the binding effect of alimony decrees. In Taylor v.
Taylor8 it had been held that if a final divorce decree does not
make an alimony award or specifically reserve the right to make
one later, no alimony may ever be granted in that action or any
other. In other words, if the husband's decree in the Murdock
case had been obtained in South Carolina rather than in Ken-
tucky, the court would have considered itself powerless to give
alimony to a woman who was no longer related to the defendant
and who had been found, on the termination of the marriage, not
entitled to alimony. The court was able to avoid the problem
posed by its Taylor holding because the husband's exceptions in
Murdock raised only the constitutional question, not the binding
effect of the Kentucky decree under South Carolina law.
Actually, as the general authorities show,9 a distinction be-
tween Taylor and Murdock would not have been difficult to
make. If the wife was not personally subject to the jurisdiction
of the divorce court, as she was not in Murdock, the court's
failure to give her alimony or to reserve the right to give it to
her later could hardly be held against her. Taylor rests on res
judicata principles. It is self-evident that an adjudication which
results in a money judgment should not bind one not truly in
court.
8. 241 S.C. 462, 128 S.E.2d 910 (1962).
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The third case to be discussed is Ford v. Ford,10 in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court made the same disposition of a
custody problem that it had made two years earlier under an
erroneous belief that it was under constitutional compulsion to
enforce a decree of a court in Virginia in the matter. The parties
were originally domiciled in North Carolina but separated be-
cause of an adulterous affair on the part of the wife. She moved
to her mother's home in Richmond and shortly thereafter, with-
out the husband's permission, removed the children from his
home and took them to Virginia. The husband immediately insti-
tuted a habeas corpus proceeding in the Virginia courts to have
custody returned to him. While the action was pending, the par-
ties, each being represented by competent counsel, worked out
an agreement as to the custody and caused the habeas corpus
action to be dismissed by what is known in the Virginia practice
as a "dismissed agreed" order. By the agreement, the husband,
still living in North Carolina, was to have custody for nine
months and the wife for three. The wife moved to Greenville,
South Carolina, and, at the beginning of the next summer, the
husband delivered the children to her there. During the summer
she commenced an action for custody in the juvenile and domestic
relations court of Greenville and served process on the husband
during an emergency visit by him to the children. Neither the
juvenile court nor the circuit court found themselves bound by
the Virginia order or the agreement on which it was based; and
the circuit decree, exactly reversing the terms of the agreement,
gave nine months custody to the wife. On appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed," holding that the "dismissed
agreed" order constituted a final judgment on the merits, was
res judicata in Virginia, and therefore was entitled to full faith
and credit in this state. Upon petition by the wife, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari'2 and, after a hearing
on the merits, reversed.'13 It pointed out that the custody agree-
ment had not been specifically approved by the Virginia court
or even examined and that the "dismissed agreed" order was
purely perfunctory. It concluded that under the circumstances
such a disposition of a custody action would not have bound the
hands of a Virginia court later called upon to pass on the issue
and therefore it could not bind the South Carolina court. The
10. 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963).
11. Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E2d 33 (1961).
12. 369 U.S. 801 (1962).
13. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
[Vol. 17
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cause was remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court "for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."
The South Carolina Supreme Court, thereby required to weigh
the merits, made the same disposition of the matter as it had
before. Starting from the basic proposition that in custody mat-
ters the welfare of the child outweighs all other considerations,
the court compared the characters of the parents and the care
and attention which the children would likely receive in the two
homes. According to Mr. Justice Moss, who wrote the opinion,
the most favorable argument for the mother, under any com-
parison, was the so-called "tender years" doctrine, a policy
which is never immutable. Although the Virginia custody agree-
ment and the Virginia order were recognized as not judicially
binding, the court expressed the strong feeling that they were
morally binding upon the parties and that one who seeks to have
such an agreement abrogated must show strong grounds. The
mother here had shown no change of any great importance in the
circumstances surrounding herself, her husband, or the children
since the day she had agreed that her husband should have cus-
tody for nine months of the year, presumably after careful con-
sideration and advice of counsel. The court was careful to point
out that it was only passing on the record that had been made
in 1960 and that any change in circumstances since that time
could, as in every case, be brought to the court's attention by the
wife in subsequent proceedings.
Grossman v. Grossman14 was a very practical decision involv-
ing the enforcement in South Carolina of a foreign support
decree. Mr. and Mrs. Grossman had been divorced in Ohio in
1935. The decree provided, in accordance with a formal agree-
ment between the parties, that the husband should make pay-
ments to the wife in the amount of one hundred and thirty dol-
lars per month for the support and maintenance of the wife and
their then minor children. Mr. Grossman moved to Charleston
in 1936, remarried there and accumulated property. Mrs. Gross-
man moved to the same city in 1951. The younger of the two
children came of age in 1944. Mr. Grossman had made no ali-
mony payments since 1948 and was sued for the arrearage in the
court of common pleas for Charleston County in 1956.
The circuit court held, in accordance with the plaintiff's con-
tentions, that the Ohio decree was a final judgment bound to be
enforced in South Carolina under the full faith and credit
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clause. It gave a money judgment against the defendant in the
amount of the unpaid alimony plus some seventy-three hundred
dollars of interest'r and established the Ohio decree as a final
judgment of the South Carolina court as to future payments.
The defendant appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Lewis, reversed by holding that the Ohio decree was not
required to be given full faith and credit by the South Carolina
courts. The question turned on whether the decree was subject to
modification by the Ohio court and Judge Lewis determined that
under Ohio law it was. Although the Ohio decisions hold that an
alimony decree is not ordinarily subject to modification as to
past-due installments,' 6 an exception is made where, as here, the
payments are partly for the support of a minor child who has
reached maturity by the time the application for modification
is made.
Judge Lewis realized that the problem here would not be
solved by a simple reversal on the constitutional point and he
therefore went on to examine the question of whether the Ohio
decree should be enforced as a matter of comity. He held that it
should, recognizing that there is a difference of opinion on the
question but concluding that the fact that the Ohio decree was
subject to retroactive modification by the courts of that state
should not make it unenforceable in this state. He was apparently
impressed by the argument in American Jurisprudence"' that if
a modifiable alimony decree could not be enforced in the juris-
diction of the husband's residence, it might well not be enforce-
able at all because of the inability of the court originally grant-
ing the divorce to get effective jurisdiction over the husband. It
was pointed out that it was to the practical advantage of both
Grossmans to settle their differences in the state where they now
live and where Mr. Grossman owns property.
15. Supporting the statement of the late John Hughes Cooper of the Columbia
Bar, in reply to a friend's praise of the inventors of radio, that "the fellow who
invented interest was no slouch."
16. The South Carolina rule is to the contrary, as Judge Lewis recognized.
See Jeter v. Jeter, 193 S.C. 278, 8 S.E.2d 490 (1940). It should also be borne
in mind that under such decisions as Johnson v. Johnson, 196 S.C. 474, 13
S.E.2d 593 (1941) our courts may in many cases effectively "modify" a foreign
alimony decree, even when it is entitled to full faith and credit, by declining to
jail the husband for contempt so long as he pays an amount set by the South
Carolina court, even though it is less than the payment fixed in the foreign
decree.
17. 17A Am. JUm Divorce and Separation § 978 (1957).
[Vol. 17l
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After going this far, there still remained the question of wheth-
er the South Carolina court could modify the amount of the
support payments on the specific ground that the children, for
whose support the Ohio order in part provided, were now of
age and no longer entitled to support from their father. Judge
Lewis had no difficulty in holding that it could and should. The
Ohio decree and the agreement which it rested upon were clear
as to the periodic payments being for both the wife and the
children, and, with the parties now before the South Carolina
court, there was no reason why it could not determine the amount
which should be allocated to the wife for her support alone.
Accordingly, the money judgment was reversed and the cause
remanded to the circuit court for a determination of the amount
properly due to the plaintiff under the Ohio decree.
The holding in Grossman that a South Carolina court may
modify an Ohio alimony decree should be contrasted with the
holding in Clinkscales v. Clinkscales"8 that the Greenville com-
mon pleas court may not change a custody order of the Anderson
County common pleas court. The parties had been divorced in
Anderson and the wife awarded custody of their two children.
She then moved to Greenville and the husband brought a new
action against her there, alleging serious misconduct on her part
since the date of the divorce and claiming custody. The wife
moved to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction in the Green-
ville court. The court refused the motion and the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed, Mr. Justice Brailsford pointing out
that section 20-115 of the Code expressly provides that it is the
divorce court which may "from time to time after final judg-
ment" make orders concerning the custody of the children of
the marriage. Since the same circuit judges preside in Anderson
and Greenville counties, the legislature may be thought to have
been overly strict in requiring the parties to go back to the orig-
inal county to obtain a modification of the decree as to custody
or alimony, but the rule has at least one practical advantage. The
circuit judge to whom the application for change is made will of
necessity read the old judgment roll.
Two cases during the review period reversed findings of de-
sertion and emphasized how subjective the desertion concept is.
In Brown v. Brown19 the husband sued for divorce and proved
that his wife had left home more than a year earlier and not
18. 243 S.C. 377, 134 S.E.2d 216 (1963).
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returned. The South Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Bussey, held that although the one year cessation
from cohabitation had been established, the plaintiff had failed
to prove the equally important element of desertion---"absence
of the opposite party's consent." It was undisputed that the wife
on several occasions, by letter and telephone, had attempted re-
conciliation but the husband had refused to see her. Her lawyer
forced him to admit on cross-examination that "he didn't want
Hazel to come back." There was testimony that at the time of
the original separation he told his wife that she had had her
chance to live with him and that she would never get another
one. It was clear to the court that the plaintiff had completely
failed to prove that his wife stayed away from him for a year
without his consent. Judge Bussey took occasion to point out that
the record contained no certificate by the trial judge that he had
made an effort to reconcile the parties as required by the stat-
ute.20 He emphasized the importance of the certificate in cases
like the present and stated that the judgment could have been
reversed on that ground alone.
The other reversal of a finding of desertion was also under
an opinion of Judge Bussey's in Boozer 'v. Boozer.21 In this in-
stance he found that the plaintiff husband had failed to prove
cessation from cohabitation for the statutory period. The wife
left the family home in Aiken, moved with the children to Union
and had lived there for longer than a year when the husband's
action was instituted; but the parties had been too often reunited
during that time for the supreme court to consider their cohabi-
tation ended. On every other weekend the husband was off work
for three or four days and had regularly spent the time with his
family in Union. With considerable frequency the wife likewise
took the children back for visits in Aiken. They all lived under
the same roof on these occasions and there were also two vacation
trips taken by the entire family. The only conflict in the testi-
mony was as to whether there was sexual intercourse between the
spouses on these occasions. The husband said there was not; the
wife that there was. Under the South Carolina Supreme Court's
view, it made little difference whether there was or not. Cohabi-
tation, according to the court, means something more than sexual
intercourse; therefore "cessation from cohabitation is not estab-
lished by proof of lack of intercourse alone." The opinion admits
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-110 (1962).
21. 242 S.C. 292, 130 S.E.2d 903 (1963).
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that there is authority2 2 for the proposition that "individual or
isolated acts of cohabitation will not operate to break the con-
tinuity of a statutory period of desertion," but observes that the
regular occupancy of family quarters by the parties here could
hardly be considered as isolated acts.
Case v. Case,23 an appeal from Greenville County, has some
rather amusing aspects. The judge of the juvenile and domestic
relations court of that county had announced, following the
hearing of the wife's action for divorce on the ground of deser-
tion, that he would grant the divorce when a formal order was
presented to him by the lawyers.24 The husband must have later
heard that the wife was changing her mind, for the next action
in the cause was a motion by him for the issuance of the prom-
ised order. At the hearing of this motion the plaintiff moved
for a "nonsuit." The judge dismissed the divorce action and con-
tinued the order granting the plaintiff temporary relief. The
husband appealed, but the South Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower tribunal's order, holding in effect that the hus-
band had no vested right in his adversary's victory. Mr. Chief
Justice Taylor, who wrote the opinion, held that there is no
finality to any judicial act until some formal written evidence
of it is filed. He said further that the policy of the South Caro-
lina courts to protect marriages would hardly lead to the court's
requiring a wife to take a divorce which she no longer wanted.
The remaining cases decided by our court during the review
period were all run-of-the-mill. Some were rich in human
interest25 but none of them involved any edifying applications
of the law. They are listed for the sake of completeness:
Todd v. Todd26 reversed the award of custody of children to
the husband and the denial of support to the wife.
Gilfillan v. Gilfilla.2 7 affirmed findings of physical cruelty
as sufficient grounds for divorce.
22. See generally 17 Am. JuL- Divorce and Separation § 240 (1957); Annot.
155 A.L.R. 132 (1945).
23. 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964).
24. Apparently he went somewhat further than that. His final order recited
that "a divorce was granted verbally."
25. E.g., Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 130 S.E.2d 552 (1963) in which the
court drew the definite impression from the testimony that a husband was doing
his clever best to send a wife back to the state hospital.
26. 242 S.C. 263, 130 S.E.2d 552 (1963).
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Rooney v. Rooney28 held evidence of habitual intoxication suf-
ficient to justify a divorce.
SMith V. SMith 29 affirmed an alimony award against the hus-
band's contention that it was more than he could pay.
Hodges v. Hodges3" reversed the granting of a divorce to a
wife on the grounds of her husband's habitual intoxication and
physical cruelty.
Oleveland v. Cleveland3l considered the propriety of certain
allowances for support and attorneys' fees.
28. 242 S.C. 503, 131 S.E.2d 618 (1963).
29. 242 S.C. 517, 131 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
30. 243 S.C. 299, 133 S.E.2d 816 (1963).
31. 243 S.C. 586, 135 S.E.2d 84 (1964).
[Vol. 17
10
outh Carol na Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss1/11
